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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
KEITH D. BULLOCK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs-

Case No.
9193

DESERET DODGE TRUCK
CENTER, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief, the appellant will be referred to as Bullock
and the respondent will be referred to as Deseret.
For the purposes of this appeal, Deseret will accept the
statement of facts recited in Bullock's brief except as
modified herein for the purpose of needed correction and
clarification and as amplified to include certain matters
omitted by Bullock.
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At the time Bullock consummated his arrangements
with Deseret to become connected with Deseret's business
he had been transferred to Atlanta, Georgia, by Chrysler
and was under the necessity of moving his family from Dallas to Atlanta if he remained with Chrysler (Dep. 11, 12
& 13.)
Furthermore, prior to leaving Chrysler, Bullock had
been transferred numerous times and was very anxious to
settle down in one place. (Dep. 11 & 12.)
The record shows, by Bullock's admissions, that he
had inside information on Chrysler's plans to establish Truck
Centers. He communicated this information to the Hinckleys with the principal purpose and motive in mind of
himself becoming a part of one of Chrysler's Truck Center
operations. The Hinckleys knew nothing about Chrysler's
plans until they had been divulged by Bullock and it was
Bullock, not Deseret or the Hinckleys who made the initial
contacts out of which the relationship between the parties
subsequently developed. Bullock was aggressively pushing
the proposal in order to establish himself in the truck center business in Salt Lake City, with himself as a key and
central figure in the operation. Bullock was not enticed
or lured by the Hinckleys from a good and satisfactory job
with any rose-tinted or extravagant promises as to his
future if he would leave Chrysler and join with the Hinckleys in the Deseret operation. Bullock was fully sold on the
desirability of getting into a truck center operation and did
his utmost to sell the Hinckleys on his ideas. (Dep. 13-14;
R. 39-42.)
The record fully and amply confirms that Bullock left
his employment with Chrysler willingly and without persuasion on the part of the Hinckleys. Deseret excepts to the
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impression sought to be created by Bullock that the Hinckleys gave assurances that the oral understandings of the
parties regarding employment for an eight-year term would
be embodied in a written document. The record shows
that a contract was executed by the parties and that this
agreement was the result of the mutual understanding of
all parties concerned. Bullock fully understood what the
agreement contained when he signed it.

Q. ccWhen you signed the agreement you knew
and understood what its contents were?"
A. cci felt I did." (Dep. 6).
Bullock himself assisted and took an active part in the
drafting of the agreement, as demonstrated by the followIng:
Q. ccN ow, with regard to exhibit cA', the agreement was drafted two or three times before it was
finally signed by the parties, wasn't it?''
A. ccAt least once, as I recall."
Q. ccAt least once, and I suppose you read it before you signed it?"
A. ccyes, sir."
Q. ccAnd it embodies the terms of the agreement of employment that you now rely upon?"
A. ccYes." (Dep. 6).
On page 2 of his brief, Bullock admits that he was
dissatisfied with the original draft of this agreement,
specifically the portions referring to stock options and demanded that it be redrafted. (R. 39-40).
The record is clear that the provisions of this agreement, such as they were, relating to employment, were
accepted by Bullock and that he signed this agreement
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without objections. These provisions of the contract make
no reference to any specified term of employment. (Exh.
((A" Para. 7). Bullock relies upon no other document in
writing to support his contentions that he had such an agreement with Deseret. (Dep. 3-6; 23). Paragraph 3 of the
agreement provided a method by which Bullock could become a participating owner in Deseret by the investment
of his own capital in the stock of the corporation while
employed. There is no claim that Bullock ever invested any
money in Deseret stock.
Deseret takes exception to Bullock's statement that he
established a going and successful wholesale truck business
for Deseret as a consequence of his managerial skill and
ability. It is submitted the record falls far short of establishing Bullock's successful management of Deseret. On the
contrary, the record shows affirmatively by evasive, but none
the less clear admissions of Bullock, that his efforts in this
regard were not successful. (Dep. 15) .
Finally, it is conceded by Bullock that when Deseret
would no longer permit him to continue as manager, he
was offered another job in the Hinckley organization,
selling trucks and unconnected with managerial duties and
responsibilities and with no cut in salary. Bullock declined
to accept this offer and took another job paying less money.
(Dep.7-8).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 4 ( 1) U. C. A. 1953) BARS BULLOCK
FROM ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CON-
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TRACT SUED UPON WHICH RESTS UPON PAROL
EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS
AND DOES NO·T REQUIRE RESORT TO EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE TO ASCERTAIN ITS MEANING.
POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE APPLICATIO·N
OF THE DOCTRINE O·F PROMISSO·RY ESTOPPEL IN
THIS CASE.
POINT IV
THE AGREEMENT RELIED UPO·N BY APPELLANT IS NO·T SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, SECTION 4 (1) U. C. A. 1953) BARS BULLOCK
FRO·M ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS O·F THE CO·NTRACT SUED UPON WHICH RESTS UPON PAROL
EVIDENCE.
The sole and only question to be determined in this appeal is whether Bullock should be permitted to introduce parol testimony to supply important and vital provisions of an
alleged employment contract not expressed in writing. If
this court agrees with the lower court that under the facts
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of this case such is not permissible, the lower court was
correct in granting respondent's motion for a summary·
judgment and should be affirmed.

It has long been the established law in this jurisdiction
that contracts of the character involved in this case fall within the provisions of the statute of frauds.
((In the following cases, every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing, subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith:
( 1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making thereof." (25-5-4(1) U.C.A.1953).
The very fact that Bullock is here contending that he
had an employment contract for an eight-year period
brings his alleged contract within the provisions of the above
Utah Statute. This statute has been construed in many cases
by this .court. The rule has been uniformly adopted and
adhered to that in order to comply with the statute the
writing or memorandum thereof must contain every essential element of the contract or the same is void.
In Birdzell vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412,
242 P2, 578, it was said:
((However, even if the letter did contain an admission, acknowledgment or recognition of the alleged prior oral agreement, there is another reason
why it will not suffice as a memorandum. It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied
upon to satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain

all the essential terms and provisions of the contract
As will be noted, the letter does not state what
the amount of the rent shall be, but expressly leaves
that question open for further negotiations. In an
::- ::- :r-
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oral contract to effect a lease for a period longer
than one year, the amount of the rent is clearly one
of the essential terms which must appear in the
memorandum ':- ::- ~· ~· ." (Italics ours).

Collett vs. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P2 730, presented facts strikingly similar to the facts in this appeal.
In that case the defendant filed a counterclaim alleging
breach of an Exclusive Distributorship Contract, which was
to run for five years and was to extend to the entire
Uintah Basin. The existence of this contract was denied and
because certain of the alleged terms of the agreement were
supplied by defendant's oral testimony, the question of the
statute of frauds was considered as to whether or not this
testimony would be admissible. Defendant relied upon the
minutes of a Board of Directors Meeting, at which a motion
was presented and approved to enter into a written contract
to give the defendant an exclusive dealership in Uintah
County. These minutes made no mention of a dealership to
be co-extensive with the Uintah Basin and made no provision for a five-year term. This court held that the
agreement was within the statute of frauds and void for
failure to state in writing all the essential terms of the
agreement. This court said:
HThe written memorandum which is relied upon
to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the
essential terms and provisions of the contract. ~· ~· ~· *
Hawaiian Equipment Co. vs. Eimco Corp., 115 Utah
590, 207, P2 794. * ~:- ~:- * but before the court can
assess damages for violations of the alleged contract
it must appear with certainty that appellant was to
have an exclusive distributorship for the entire Uintah Basin * ~· ~:- ."

This court also said:
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celt is elementary that compliance with the statute of frauds cannot be effected by producing a writing of some contract different from the contract on
which the party is basing his claim. Appellant testified at the trial of this case that the exclusive distributorship granted to him by the refining company
was to run for five years; whereas the writing on
which he relies does not mention any time element
whatsoever :~o ::- * * it is apparent that the agreement
proposed in the minutes of the board of directors is
not the same agreement appellant is attempting to
establish in this action. For this reason the minutes
are not a memorandum of the alleged contract."
See also Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section
207, which states that one of the elements of a valid contract, enforceable under the statute, shall state:
n (c) The terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom and to
whom the promises are made."
That these principles are also applicable to contracts of
employment is made clear by this court in Abba vs. Smith,
21 Utah 109, 59 P 756. That case specifically dealt with an
employment contract for three years. It was held that the
memorandum considered by the court satisfied the requirements of the statute and in that case this court said:
((Under this section unless the essential terms of
the contract can be determined from the contract
itself, it is within the statute of frauds, and if thus
defective, the defect cannot be supplied by parol
proof, for by admitting parol testimony to supply
the essential parts of the contract, would be to restore the mischief which the statute of frauds was
framed to prevent :.'- * * ."
This opinion quotes with approval from Pomeroy on
Contracts as follows:
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~~The memorandum, whether consisting of one
writing, or of several, must contain all the essential
terms of the agreement so stated, that while parol
evidence may, perhaps, be resorted to for the purposes of identification, and to explain the situation of
the parties and of the subject matter, it shall not be

required to supply any substantive feature which has
been omitted ::- :1- ):-." (Italics ours.)
It is respectfully submitted that when a party expects
a court of law to find that he has contractural rights entitling him to employment for eight years or any other
period beyond a year and the only writing which he can produce concerning such agreement omits any reference to such
vital period, such memorandum or contract is so lacking in
essential and substantive terms as to be unenforceable and
may not be supplemented by oral testimony.
It is not urged or contended by Bullock that he has
any other writing or agreement than the stock option agreement which will supply the missing essential parts necessary
to constitute the contract upon which he relies.
At the outset Bullock concedes that the writing upon
which he relies does not expressly state any specified term
of employment. The written agreement, so far as it contains any provisions relating to employment, is as follows:
cc7. The Company agrees to employ Keith Bullock as its general manager and to employ Raymond
Hunter as its wholesale manager." (Ex. ccA").
Bullock's brief is a tacit admission that the statute of
frauds applies to the agreement upon which he relies and
his entire argument is an attempt to escape the consequences
of the statute.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND
DOES NOT REQUIRE RESORT TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO ASCERTAIN ITS MEANING.
Bullock's first proposition is that the agreement was
drafted by Deseret's attorneys and hence the language employed in the agreement must be construed in his favor. So
far as the record is concerned there is nothing to support
this claim. On the ·Contrary, the record affirmatively shows
that Bullock himself took an active and aggressive part in
the draftsmanship of the agreement. This is true to the
extent that he insisted upon the redrafting thereof to include
provisions he was dissatisfied with. (Dep. 6; R. 39-40).
Inasmuch as Bullock has gone outside the record to state
that respondent's attorneys drafted the agreement, perhaps
Deseret will be justified in likewise departing from the record merely to state that Bullock attended many conferences
in the office of the attorneys where the agreement was written and gave instructions to the attorney concerning what
the agreement should contain. The surrounding circumstances fairly establish that in the drafting of the agreement
the attorney acted almost solely in the capacity of an
amanuensis for all the parties, who in conference, instructed
him regarding what the agreen1ent was to contain. Bullock's
participation in its preparation was far from passive; when
the final draft was complete he read and signed the agreement, understanding what it contained and accepted it in
the form in which it now appears without further change
or objection. Furthermore, he considered it to fully embody
the understanding of the parties. (Dep. 6).
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In the guise of having the contract construed so as to
include provisions which it does not contain and which
would require the redrafting of the agreement, Bullock relies upon the well-known rule that a document prepared by
one party as an agreement between himself and another
should, in case it contains uncertain or ambiguous language,
be construed against the party who wrote or had it written.
The fallacy in Bullock's proposition is not that the rule
which he cites is incorrect; this rule is well understood by all
courts, but it can have no application to this case, because
the language of the agreement is neither doubtful nor ambiguous. Furthermore, even if a document is so far ambiguous as to permit application of the rule, no case goes
so far as to hold that language may be imported into it
which it does not contain under the claim that that which
is missing constitutes ambiguity.

An agreement is not construed against the party who
prepared it, ipso facto, because such party wrote it or had
it written, but only if its meaning is doubtful and it is
susceptible of more than one meaning. As stated by this
court in Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing Comp.any, 120
Utah 241, 233 P2 355, the rule is stated thus:

(():- * * plaintiff also invokes the rule of interpretation that doubtful and ambiguous terms in a
contract should be interpreted against the party who
has chosen its terms ):- ~· ::- we agree that this rule of
construction should be considered in determining
what is a reasonable and fair interpretation of the
intention of the parties. However, if the language
is clear and is not susceptible of more than one interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words
must be used.''
The very cases cited by counsel state this rule clearly.
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Thus, in Huber & Roland Construction Co. vs. City of South
Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2 273, 323 P2 558, this court said:

H* ~- :-.. Doubtful or ambiguous portions of a contract should be construed against the party who draws
it. (Italics ours).
In Continental Bank & Trust Company vs. Bybee, 6
Utah 2 98 306 P2 773, this court announced the rule in
this language:
~- ~- the intent should be ascertained first
from the four corners of the instrument itself, second
from other contemporaneous writings and third from
the extrinsic parol evidence of the intentions ~- * *
if the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable
interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence
should not be allowed ~- * ~-."
H :-.-

Again, in Penn Star Mining Company vs. Lyman, 64
Utah 343, 231 P 107, it was stated:
((There is still another element to which the
courts under certain circumstances, have recourse,

in case the language in a contract is ambiguous o-r
uncertain, which is that, where one of the parties, or
one who is directly interested in the subject matter
of the contract, has prepared it and has used language which is ambiguous or uncertain in its meaning, the language will be construed most strongly
against the party who has used the ambiguous or uncertain language * : - ~... " (Italics ours).
The case of Universal Underwriters Insurance Company vs. Bush, CCA10 272 Fed. 2, 675, was a case involving consideration of the language of an insurance contract and certain claimed ambiguities which it contained in
which the insured was contending the language should be
construed in his favor. In its opinion, that court quotes
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from Bergholm vs. Peoria. Life Insurance Company, 284,
U. S. 489, 76 Law Ed. 416, as follows:

nit is true that where the terms of a policy are
of doubtful meaning, construction most favorable to
the insured will be adopted :~o * *. This canon of
construction is both reasonable and just, since the
words of the policy are chosen by the insurance
company; but it furnishes no warrant for avoiding
hard consequences by importing into a contract an
ambiguity which otherwise would not exist, or, under the guise of construction by forcing from plain
words unusual or unnatural meanings * :~o )!·."
It is submitted that Bullock's first proposition is without merit because Bullock has not pointed out any ambiguous or uncertain language in the agreement. Furthermore,
a party who participates actively in the preparation and
drafting of an agreement to which he is a party may not
invoke the rule for his own benefit to relieve himself from
the consequences of a contract which he would like to
repudiate after it has been signed and accepted.
POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRO·MISSO·RY ESTOPPEL IN
THIS CASE.
Bullock places his main reliance for reversal of the
lower court upon the claim of estoppel. At the outset, in
connection with this contention, he also admits that the
agreement is entirely lacking in giving to him by express
terms a contract of employment for eight years. The
ground of the alleged estoppel is that he gave up other employment in order to accept a position with Deseret and
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moved his family from Dallas to Salt Lake City upon a
promise that he would be employed by Deseret for at least
eight years and hence it would be a fraud to permit Deseret
to discharge him without liability for the alleged damages
he has suffered as a consequence. The authorities and text
writers cited by Bullock all say that it is not unusual for an
employment contract to be silent upon the period of time
for which the employment is to endure. Thus, Corbin ort
Contracts, Section 684, page 685, says:
tr.::- :r- :r- Neither party may have any definite
period of service in mind; in which case it is natural for them to say nothing about it, and the employment is terminable at the will of either
party ::- ::- ::-."

Corbin then goes on to say that the exception to the exception of the general rule that the statute of frauds may
not be pleaded as a defense to an oral contract rests upon
negligence or the intentional misleading of one of the parties
by the other in which case an estoppel may be applicable.
In Restate1nent of Agency 2, Section 442, it is likewise
stated that mutual promises to employ and serve unless
otherwise agreed are terminable upon notice by either party
and further that if no time is specified and no consideration is given for entering into the relationship other than
a promise in general terms to employ or serve, may run
only so long as either party wishes. If, however, the principal re.ceives from the agent a promise other than a promise
to serve, the promise to employ may be interpreted to extend
for a period of time which is reasonable in view of the purposes of the party who gives the consideration. An example
of such consideration is cited as where in the sale of a business, a promise is made to the former owner that he shall
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continue to be employed in the business in which case such
a promise may be interpreted to employ the former owner
for a reasonable time. The authority, however, continues
and says that if the contract is unilateral, so that the principal receives nothing for his promise to employ other than
the employee's promise to serve, such employment may properly be terminated by either party at will.
Counsel places great reliance upon Ravarino vs. Price,
123 Utah 559, 260 P2 570, in which case this court carefully considered the doctrine of promissory estoppel and
refused to apply it to the facts of that case. Briefly stated,
the facts claimed by the plaintiff were that he purchased a
piece of real estate which he otherwise would not have purchased except for the defendant's promise that defendant
would sell a parcel of real estate which he owned to the
plaintiff which was adjacent to the tract which the plaintiff
bought. The agreement was not signed by the defendant and
the statute of frauds was set up as a defense and this
defense was held by this court to be applicable. In deciding
that case this court referred to Papanikolas vs. Sampson, 73
Utah 404, 274 P 856, where this court said:
~~- ~~- ~· ccnor as a general rule can fraud be predicated upon the failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds, since in such case the promisor has not, in a
legal sense, made a contract, and hence has the
right, both in law and equity, to refuse to perform."

In that case also, this court quoted from Price vs.
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P 767 as follows:
ucourts of equity, in establishing the doctrine
invoked by plaintiff, have not, by any means, intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to
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prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to
give evidence of a contract not in writing and which
is in the very teeth of the statute and a nullity at
law, it is essential that he establish (in equity), by
cleat and positive proof, acts and things done in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively referrable
thereto and which take it out of the operation of the
statute."
Bullock cites two cases, in both of which an estoppel
was applied or the rules were stated under which it might be
invoked. The first of these cases is Seymour vs. Oelrichs,
California 106 P 88. In that case plaintiff, a Police Captain
in San Francisco, was persuaded to give up his position on
the San Francisco Police Force to go and work for the defendants upon the promise that if he would do so, he would
receive a contract of employment for ten years and upon
his representation that he could not afford to quit his job
unless he was granted employment for such a period of
time. Another fact of great importance in that case was
that the plaintiff had a lifetime position with a pension
awaiting him upon retirement about which the defendants
knew. Acting upon the promise that an agreement would
be written employing him for ten years, the plaintiff resigned and started to work for the defendants. When he
requested that the agreement be reduced to writing, he
was told by Mr. Fair, who had hired him, that Mr. Fair
was too busy to have the writing prepared, but would
do so as soon as he returned from a trip to Europe. Resting
upon the security of these assurances the plaintiff commenced
his employment with the defendant. Mr. Fair was killed
and the agreement was never reduced to writing and after
a couple of years the plaintiff was discharged. The Califor-
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nia court, in deciding this ·Case, held that an estoppel would
apply to prevent the defendants from pleading the statute
of frauds as a defense if plaintiff could establish agency between Mr. Fair and defendants.
The other case cited by Bullock is Alaska Air Lines, Inc.
vs. Stephenson, C. C. A. 9, 217 Fed. 2 295. In that case
plaintiff was hired to be general manager of the defendant
airline company and moved from California to Alaska. He
claimed that when he was hired, he was promised that he
would receive a two-year employment contract in writing,
which would be presented to him within six weeks to three
months after he commenced work. Plaintiff was entitled to
a six months leave of absence from Western Airlines, which
he took. When the six months leave of absence was about to
expire, he renewed his effort to have his employment contract
reduced to writing, to no avail. After his leave of absence
with Western Air had expired, defendant discharged the
plaintiff, who sued for loss of wages and other damages as a
result of his discharge. The court in that case very reluctantly
allowed plaintiff to recover.
Bearing in mind the fact that promissory estoppel may
be invoked under proper circumstances, the question still
remains as to whether the undisputed facts in this case measure up to the requirements of the rule and to those facts in
the cases where this rule has been applied. We submit that this
record falls far short of the cases cited by appellant or the
text writers upon which he relies.
The chronology of evidence in this case is interesting and
important. Long before December 13, 1957, negotiations had
been going on between Bullock and the other incorporators of
Deseret. These negotiations resulted in the execution of a con-
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tract between the parties on that date, after it had been modified and changed to meet Bullock's objections thereto. This
agreement was primarily a stock option agreement but did
contain references to appellant's employment as General
Manager. (Exhibit uA"). Bullock took the position then, as
he does now, that this instrument was an employment contract as well as a stock option agreement. He accepted the
agreement as embodying employment provisions without any
objections after reading and fully understanding its provisions. He commenced working for Deseret on January 8,
1958. (Dep. 6; R. 39 and 40).
A copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Deseret are
in this record. (R. 56-65). The time of the execution of these
articles does not appear in this record. However, the files in
the Secretary of State's Office show that the articles were not
executed until December 26, 1957 and were filed on December 30, 1957. Under these articles Bullock was an incorporator, was one of the six directors and vice-president. Bullock
assumed and discharged these offices as well as that of general
manager of the corporation for approximately a full year.
Bullock asserts in his brief that he would not have terminated
his employment with Chrysler until given assurance that he
would have an employment contract.There is nothing in the
pleadings or in any of the other parts of this record which
support this contention. Not even the affidavits in the record
make this assertion. The complaint alleges that Bullock had
an employment contract, which he attaches as Exhibit HA"
to his complaint and which he says Deseret breached. There is
no allegation in the complaint that he was promised a written
contract which Deseret refused to honor after he was employed or that he would not have quit a job to become conne.cted with Deseret without such a contract in writing. His
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affidavits merely allege that he relied upon Exhibit ccA" as an
employment agreement for eight years.
In none of the cases cited and relied upon by Bullock are
the facts similar to this case. In those cases there was no contract in writing at all, although the employee resigned other
employment, relying upon a promise that a written contract
would be forthcoming. In those cases there was a situation
also where the employee had been induced or persuaded to
leave his job. In this case, Bullock was the promotor and principal figure in setting up a new and untried business and thus
creating for himself a new business enterprise in which he had
high anticipations of success.
This court has had occasion to construe the case of Seymour vs. Oelrich's, supra, in Ravarino vs. Price, supra, and
also in Easton vs. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2, 386, 295 P2 332. In the
Easton case we have all the elements present on which Bullock
would rely for a reversal.
In that case, which involved an oral promise to execute
a written lease, the facts were that the defendant had promised to have a written lease drawn up which would satisfy
the statute of frauds and upon the basis of this promise the
plaintiff had moved his business from Trinidad, Colorado, to
Utah and had entered into the premises where the lease was to
be in effect with the knowledge of the defendant and thereafter, having moved into the premises, the defendant refused
to execute a written lease, whereupon plaintiff sued for damages, claiming his inability to negotiate a favorable lease with
the owner of the leased premises. The defendant pleaded the
statute of frauds, and, as in this case, the plaintiff asserted
that the defendant should be estopped from relying on the
statute of frauds. It was held estoppel would not apply and
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that the lower court had acted properly in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In the course of
the opinion in the Easton case, this court says:

* :-'" :-'" ctthe mere refusal to execute a written contract as agreed does not constitute (fraud' within the
rule that the statute of frauds will not be enforced
where the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud.
::- * ::- and to hold otherwise, would, in effect, completely nullify the statute of frauds."
In discussing the Oelrichs case, supra, this court pointed
out that Seymour gave up a lifetime position in order to enter
the defendant's service and also refers to the case of Morris
Company vs. Mason, Okla. 39 P2 1 43 P2 401. The Morris
case involved also a long term employment contract which
was to be reduced to writing and this court says, in discussing
that decision, that the position which the plaintiff gave up
was one which was terminable by his former employer and
that his moving was not occasioned by any promise of employment. These facts are strikingly similar to the case at bar.
Bullock was working for Chrysler, but there was nothing
which prevented Chrysler from discharging him. He had no
lifetime contract and, as we have pointed out, Bullock would
have been obliged to move anyway, because he had already
been transferred by Chrysler to Atlanta, Georgia. This court
refers also in that case to Albany Peanut Company vs. Euclid
Candy Company, Calif. 85 P2 471, from which the following
is quoted:
The circumstances must clearly indicate
that it would be a fraud for the party offering the
inducements to assert the invalidity of a contract under the statute and unless the words and conduct
of the party sought to be held amount to an induce((*

, ..

::-
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ment to the other to waive a written contract in
reliance upon the representation that the person promising will not avail himself of the statute of frauds
there is an absence of fraud which is requisite to an
estoppel. ~. . * * a mere promise to execute a written
contract followed by refusal to do so, is not sufficient
to create an estoppel, even though reliance is placed
upon such promise and damages occasioned by such
refusal. The acts and conduct of the promisor must
so clearly indicate that he did not intend to avail himself of the statute that to permit him to do so would
be to work a fraud upon the other party * * ::-."
And, futhermore, this court stated the following in the
Easton case:
((If an action sounding in tort were allowed in
every instance where the contract was unenforceable
because not in writing and barred by the statute of
frauds, the statute would be rendered meaningless."
We submit that this record is. entirely lacking in even a
suggestion that Bullock was given to understand that Deseret
would not avail itself of the defense of the statute of frauds;
that the principles announced by the Easton case must be
applied and that there is no fraud present upon which an
estoppel can be based upon the bare contention made by Bullock that he was led to believe by the contract which was
signed between the parties that he was being employed for
at least eight years.
Finally, if Exhibit ((A" is an employment contract, as
Bullock asserts, there can be no promissory estoppel, because
according to Bullock himself, Deseret did in fact give him a
written contract of employment terminable at will. We submit that it is wholly inconsistent for Bullock to contend in
one breath that the agreement he relies upon is an employ-
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ment contract legally sufficient to form the basis of his claim
and to fully meet the requirements of the statute of frauds
and in the next breath to assert that he was entitled to such a
contract in writing and that Deseret's failure to perform this
promise forms the basis of an estoppel to prevent the pleading
of the statute of frauds.
If the agreement which Bullock accepted after reading,
and fully understanding it, did not contain the entire agreement of the parties, Bullock had ample opportunity to object
before it was signed and thus to have it corrected and to embody what he now asserts was the true agreement of the
parties. He knew what was in this contract when it was
signed and its language could not possibly have misled him to
assume that he was employed for eight years.
We submit that the record supports Deseret's contention
that Exhibit ((A" reflected the entire and complete agreement
of the parties and that there is no basis in this case for the
principle of estoppel to be applied.
Additionally, we desire to point out that if Bullock
wished to rely upon estoppel in this case, it was his obligation
and duty to plead the facts upon which the estoppel would be
based. In Collett vs. Goodrich, supra, this court held in the
following language that a party relying upon promissory
estoppel must plead it:
H:r- :.t. :,t. Where estoppel is not pleaded, it is inadmissible :,t. :,t. ::- :,t. The object of the declaration is to
give the defendant fair notice of the case he is called
into court to meet :,t. :.t. :.t. under the circumstances of
the instant case, the appellant need not anticipate
what defenses were intended to be relied upon, within the plea of general denial in order to affirmatively
plead that respondent is estopped from relying upon
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the statute of frauds '~ '~ '~ the statute of frauds is a
defense which may be waived if the party desires to
stand on the oral contract. It should be expressly and
clearly invoked before a pleading of estoppel be required, in order to dispense with the necessity of
producing a written contract or a written memorandum thereof. But there was ample opportunity at the
trial to amend and plead estoppel, after counsel for
appellant were specifically apprised of respondent's
reliance on the defense of the statute of frauds. No
amendment was asked, nor did appellant's motion for
a new trial mention estoppel. So far as the record
shows, it appears initially in appellant's brief.
Although .estoppel may be considered for the first
time on appeal in some equity cases, Mason v. Ellison,
63 Ariz. 196, 160 P2d 326, the majority view is that
the question will not be considered by the appellate
court without first having been properly presented
to the trial court. Appellant should have requested
permission to amend and plead estoppel or it should
appear in the pre-trial order. Having failed to do so
it is not properly presented for determination."
In this case, after the filing of Deseret's amendment
pleading the statute of frauds, Bullock made no attempt to
amend to plead estoppel. This question is presented for the
first time in Bullock's brief and is too late. The record shows
Deseret's pleading of the statute of frauds was served on Bullock on October 1, 1959. No reply to this amendment was
ever filed. The motion for summary judgment was argued
October 13, 1959. Both parties filed written memoranda with
the lower court. At no place until the filing of his brief did
Bullock give notice that he was intending to rely on estoppel
to escape the operation of the statute of frauds. That he had
ample opportunity prior to the filing of his brief to do so is
clear.
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POINT IV
THE AGREEMENT RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
What we have already said regarding the question of
estoppel and the legal insufficiency of the agreement to
satisfy the statute of frauds on the question of Bullock's employment for eight years largely disposes of appellant's next
contention that this agreement was in law sufficient and
hence is not subject to the statute of frauds.
Under Bullock's third point, he again concedes that the
agreement made no provision for a definite emplonnent
term. On the basis of this admission, we can only reiterate
that which we have already said, viz., that where an employee
relies upon a definite agreement to employ for a term of
years, this provision being one of the essential terms of such a
contract, must be in writing, notwithstanding Bullock's contentions to the contary. Bullock, in order to escape the common requirements of the statute, attempts to use the stock
option provisions of the agreement to supply the necessary
writing to support an agreement to employ him for at least
eight years. He dismisses as insignificant the language of
Article 3 of this contract which expressly says that the option
to purchase stock must be exercised during his employment.
We submit that this is an untenable position in the face of
the rule which declares that the language of a written agreement must all be considered in seeking to determine the intention of the parties.
One of the prime purposes of stock option agreements
in favor of employees is to offer them an incentive to remain
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with the organization which grants it. It was therefore most
natural for this agreement to provide that the stock options
should only be exercised during Bullock's employment. It
could hardly be expected that such an option would run in
perpetuity and hence a time limit was provided during which
Bullock, though employed, was required to make up his mind
if he wanted to buy the stock covered by the option. It was
made plain by language of the agreement that these options
must be exercised not later than eight years after the date of
the agreement. There is nothing in the agreement to support
Bullock's contention that Deseret solely and acting alone
chose eight years as the outside limit of exercising the options
-this was a provision mutually agreed upon. It is. a non sequitur for Bullock to argue that because his agreement gave
him eight years to purchase stock, if his employment continued that long, that this privilege constituted any assurance
or promise that he was to be employed for that period of
time. Bullock likewise argues that the second option, which
provided for the purchase of stock in the event the Hinckleys
desired to sell, gave to Bullock the right to purchase from
Hinckleys regardless of whether he was employed at the time
the stock was offered for sale. We submit that such construction is unreasonable and in contradiction of Article 3 of
the contract, which limited his right to purchase stock to the
time when he was still employed. The plain meaning of the
contract is that Bullock's right to purchase stock was to be
exercised during employment and not afterwards.
Bullock relies upon the case of Magness vs. Madden, Ark.
207 SW2, 714, for the proposition that where an employee is
given a right to buy an interest in a business which he may
exercise for a definite period of time, such fact is evidence of
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an intention that the employee is to be employed for a period
coextensive with his right to acquire such an interest. That
case is not authority for the case presented by this record.
First, because, as counsel points out, the business involved was
a partnership and did not involve a stock option and secondly,
because in that case there is no limitation upon the employee's
right to buy an interest in the business for five years. In this
case, on the other hand, the agreement gives no such unqualified right, but expressly limits the right to the period of actual employment. Furthermore, we submit that the Madden
case is directly contrary to the Utah decisions which hold that
every essential element of a contract not to be performed in
one year must be in writing. Furthermore, there is no merit
to the contention made that Bullock paid consideration for
his employment in addition to his promise to serve. The record shows absolutely no other promise made by Bullock than
that he would work for Deseret.
As we pointed out in Restatement of Agency, Section
442 (c) , supra, an employment contract is unilateral if no
consideration is given by the employee. Bullock made no
promise to work for eight or any other number of years. He
was free to quit or resign at any time, nor was he obligated to
buy any stock. The only thing in the way of additional consideration to which Bullock can point is that he gave up another job and moved his family. We have already pointed out
the reasons why this cannot be considered a consideration to
support a promise of a definite term of employment. Aside
from the fact that Bullock quit a job and moved to Salt Lake
this case is no different than any other case in which an employee, in order to accept a new job, must necessarily resign
from his old position.
There is no element of inequity or unfairness established
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by a showing that an employee has quit a job or moved his
family, standing alone, to justify setting aside the statute of
frauds. The authorities cited by Bullock hold that much more
must be involved. We return once more to the unquestioned
facts of this case that there was no inducement by Deseret
which prompted Bullock to quit Chrysler. This he proposed
doing himself. All of the facts established that he was eager
to do so and nothing appears in the record to support his contention that he would not have quit Chrysler without an
eight-year contract. We submit further that Bullock's position is unreasonable when it is considered that Deseret had
not even been incorporated when the· agreement was signed;
that it was a new and untried business; that no one could
possibly foretell or guarantee that it would be successful.
Under these circumstances to say that Bullock was to be
guaranteed eight years of employment, regardless of what
happened and without any corresponding obligation on him
to continue the employment is putting a strain upon credulity.
Bullock states that the reason he was offered another
job with Hinckleys was because Deseret did not dare to discharge him because it well knew and understood that the
contract is much different than Deseret now argues it to be.
This is a gratuitous statement wholly unsupported by any
evidence in the record.
The last proposition argued by Bullock under point four
is that the offer of another job by Hinckleys at a salary as
good as the one paid by Deseret would not cast upon him the
duty of acceptance in mitigation of his damage. There is no
attempt, however, to deny that Bullock was actully offered
such employment at as good a salary as the one previously en-
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joyed, and there is nothing in the record to support the proposition that the offer was conditioned upon Bullock surrendering or giving up any contractual rights. He chose not to
accept this offer and the record is therefore conclusive that
he did not desire to mitigate his loss and voluntarily accepted
other employment for less compensation.

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed,
because an essential part of the alleged agreement upon which
appellant relies was not in writing and hence appellant is
barred from recovery by the statute of frauds. There is no
basis in the facts and circumstances for an estoppel nor was
estoppel ever pleaded. The agreement between the parties is
not ambiguous in its terms so as to permit the admission of
parol evidence to explain any doubtful or ambiguous provision. The agreement was signed and accepted by both parties
and especially by Bullock after his active participation in its
drafting and preparation.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
and ALBERT R. BOWEN
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